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INDIAN ETHICS
Indian thinkers, like their counterparts elsewhere, recognized morality’s pervasiveness 
throughout human life and culture, and did not shy away from enquiry into the nature 
of morality, right and wrong, and good and bad. On the side of “good” they placed such 
values as happiness, health, survival, progeny, pleasure, calmness, friendship, knowledge 
and truth. Th e “bad” were, more or less, opposites or disvalues: misery, suff ering, sickness, 
injury, death, barrenness, pain, anger, enmity, ignorance, error and untruth. Th ese positive 
and negative qualities are universalized, in principle at least, for all sentient beings, for it 
was felt that the highest good (summum bonum) is possible when the whole world can 
enjoy the good things that the cosmos has to off er.
Refl ecting upon the meaning or applications of these judgements has been the way of 
bringing theory to bear upon the time- worn practices intended to yield the highest good. 
Th ese may extend from ritual performances and collective desires to aff ective responses 
to challenging situations from their surroundings. In much of Indian philosophy, the 
beginning point is not discursive theorizing on fi rst principles, axiomatic propositions, 
rational intuitions and so on. Rather, the starting point is the practices that are embedded 
or grounded in all human cognitive, aff ective, social- political and even aesthetic eff orts. 
Over time these practices come to be embodied in a tradition and only then in compre-
hensive doctrines, or articulated fi rst in oral and later in written texts foreshadowed by, 
and prefi guring, other scriptural texts. Questions about their own beginnings – histori-
cal or conceptual – seem prosaic and unwarranted (Mohanty 1995: 8). Th e subsequent 
hermeneutic and critical exegesis of these practices via the texts encapsulating their inten-
tionalities (bhāvanas) lend themselves to interpretations, protocols or laws in the sense of 
practical wisdom (akin to Aristotle’s phronesis), but not rigidly in the sense of theoria or 
purely discursive judgement as, for example, in Kant.
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Detached thinking about morality – as on science and logic – seems to us to be more 
important than living precariously by the normative repertoire of the community into 
which an individual has been born, raised and – if fortunate enough – educated. But a 
person does not live by theory alone – if one lives by theory at all. Spinoza reminded the 
West of its fi rst “calling” to ethics in this regard, and his method was not one dictated by 
science but by the human imaginary of natural reason and the full range of human inter-
ests, desires, feelings and passions.
DHARMA’S VIRTUE
One term in classical Indian ethical discourse is perhaps the crucial one, and the closest 
Indian equivalent to the notion of ethics: “dharma”. Th is notion embodies the traditional 
pursuit of moral values and constitutes a distinctively essential aspect of Indian ethical 
culture, nearer to (if not a direct infl uence on) Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit (the actual 
ethical order that regulates the conduct of the individual, family, civil life and state) than 
it is to Kant’s ideal conception of the moral law (Tripathi 2004: 122). It has both a theo-
retical and a practical aspect. “Dharma” is semantically connected with the idea of r. ta, 
the underlying natural order in the Hindu belief system that connects individuals, society 
and the universe as a whole. Th is constitutes an overarching social, moral and natural 
order that must be maintained, and that relies on human compliance with respect to 
renouncing selfi sh desires and accepting individual responsibility. In this regard the self 
that is anchored in dharma is inexorably a “relational social self ” (N. Gier, cited in Puri 
2013: n. 4).
Th is highest good is the telos, the creative purpose and motivation that underpins 
human behaviour. Th e summum bonum, however, expresses itself in the total harmony 
or homology of the cosmic and natural order thus characterized. R. ta, then, conveys the 
struggle for balance in the world and for the welfare of all beings, including gods, humans 
and animals. Th e interconnectedness of humanity and nature is a recurring idea and 
the foundation of the traditional ethical system. Th e belief is that the all- encompassing 
cosmic order must be upheld by dharma, the embodiment of rights, duties, laws, justice, 
virtue and truth. Dharma is the fi xed position of duty and of right, in the sense of what 
is proper and normative. It is by no means restricted to the realm of personal ethics, but 
also designates religious observance and secular law, prescribing the individual’s social 
and legal standing within the wider domains of community, caste and station. Expanding 
its range even further, dharma connotes a general principle or law of nature to which the 
individual is bound in a two- fold sense, both in terms of supporting the cosmic, social and 
personal orders, and deriving from them a corresponding obligation. Th us, as universal 
order, it assigns to each entity, personal or impersonal, its specifi c place within the wider 
community.1
In its cosmic, and not simply personal, range, and because of its dual meaning of ethical 
duty and right, dharma cannot be identifi ed straightforwardly with any of the Western 
conceptions of duty, much less with the Kantian maxim of the necessity to perform an 
action (or refrain from acting in certain situations) “out of respect for law” (and not from 
any consideration for the intrinsic moral worth, purpose, end served or the fruits resulting 
from the action qua action: Hutchings & Bilimoria 1988). While the imperative of dharma 
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imposes upon human beings obligations towards both fellow humans and non- human 
beings, it is by no means akin to the Christian idea of obedience and humility towards 
God or, in its secular version, obedience towards a supreme lawgiver, even if, as in Kant, 
that lawgiver may be oneself. It is not categorical in an absolute sense – that is, for each 
and every conceivable action – but is rather the paradigm that circumscribes and lays 
out the general framework for all possible virtues (and conversely the “vices” as well). In 
that sense, one could say that dharma stands for the paradigmatic Law, not the Holy Law.
Here is how it pans out, for example, in respect of obligations or performing one’s 
duty as an act of virtue. Dharma prescribes the acknowledgment of obligations not only 
towards a higher or supreme being, but also towards other, lesser beings and, again, not as 
a creaturely duty but as a cosmic responsibility. Dharma is not only a negative obligation 
in the shape of the restraints of duty, but it is equally the sustaining power of right in the 
sense of righteousness. Self- preservation and the preservation of all things, animate and 
inanimate, are equally sacred aspects of this mutual cosmic contract. Th at is to say, there 
is a system of reciprocal duties and rights geared to maintaining the cosmic, social and 
structural orders of the universe. Virtue requires that one performs one’s duty and lives 
within its limits rather than by the excesses of rights claims. Th e unity of duties (obligations 
or “rites”) and rights (“right”) is captured succinctly in the age- old concept of adhikāra 
(Bilimoria 1993). Th e discursive trope of dharma, then, serves to foreground all refl ections 
on virtues under the reciprocal binary of obligations and rights, as will be shown in the 
course of the discussion that follows.
Human beings are not merely the Aristotelian zoon politikon or political animal, but 
zoon kosmikon as well, and thus the range of dharma is wider and deeper than any of its 
Western equivalents. Dharma is the idea of universal justice involving responsibility in its 
widest sense, a responsibility for the whole cosmos, not in the form of any external com-
pulsion, but as immanent necessity, so that all that has ever come into existence produces 
its specifi c reaction or eff ect–the law of action and reaction as laid down by the principle 
of karma, which is more a metaphysical than an ethical doctrine in the usual Western 
interpretation.
APPLICATIONS OF DHARMA
Since the discussion of Buddhist thinking on virtues is covered elsewhere in this volume, 
the focus here will specifi cally be on Hindu treatments of virtue ethics, with some refer-
ence to Jaina ethics that dialectically infl uenced the direction taken in Indian ethics right 
down to Gandhi. Nevertheless, it is important to mention the Yoga- Śraman. a (ascetic) tra-
dition as the common fount from which much of the Buddhist and Jaina (and to an extent, 
responses within classical Hindu) moral thought has arisen. It was from their critiques of 
various outmoded Brahmanic- Hindu practices that certain transformational shift s pre-
cipitated from the highly ritualistic ethos of the Vedic corpus to the more morally prob-
lematized normativity of the Smr. ti (“as if recollected”) corpus that came to be comprised 
by the Arthaśāstra, epics (especially the Rāmāyan. a, Mahābhārata and its philosophical 
book, Th e Bhagavad- Gītā), emerging with a stronger social and self- refl exive conscience 
(Bilimoria 2007). Th e Vedic norms came increasingly into question, undermining the erst-
while normative structuration, confi dence, violence and power that this kind of formative 
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moral plank – supposed to embody the originary and founding insights of Indian ethics 
and law – made possible or sanctioned. Th e legacy of this period and the texts/textuality 
arising therefrom have left  a large gap in the more logocentrically grounded Indian ethics: 
a gap with which philosophers, jurists, ethicists and political thinkers are still grappling.
Yoga- Śraman. a morality had focused on smaller social units like the family as the focus 
of economic and moral uplift . In general terms, the emphasis was not always on “what 
should I do?”, but rather “what sort of person ought I be?” Individuals who develop the 
right kind of character would respond through discerning thinking and aff ective will 
(vyavasāyātmikābuddhih. ) to particular situations in the most natural way, by taking the 
context into account: a process also captured in Aristotle’s ideas of phronēsis and orthos- 
logos. Moral freedom here involves a more refl ective turn of mind than the mere ability or 
dexterous “skill” (technai) towards negotiating varying choices; the latter may well result in 
excellent “product” while a virtuous act may yield no product as such, for it may suffi  ce as a 
mere appropriate gesture (e.g. showing pathos or empathy in another’s grievous suff ering).2
Both in the area of interpersonal relations among humans, as well as our attitudes to the 
non- human world, Yoga- Śraman. a does not use a kind of interpersonal measuring tech-
nique but responds in terms of the more emotionally binding pathways of compassion and 
kindness. Sharper distinctions in the moral sphere like those between benevolence and 
kindness, kindness and compassion, compassion and sympathetic joy are hard to catch 
through an impersonal calculus. Utilitarian philosophy, especially as represented in the 
work of Bentham and the Mills, emerged in a certain historical context and, to be fair to 
that philosophy, it has to function within that framework. Th e Yoga- Śraman. a framework 
is somewhat diff erent, in spite of the formal resemblances to utilitarianism in upholding 
a moral theory with a teleological- consequentialist axis.
Th e Buddha himself, following the cue from the Yoga- Śraman. a and Jaina critiques of 
Brahmanic- Hindu ritualism, couched the discussion of virtues in terms of the rightful 
performance of social duties and moral obligations rather than the ascription of virtues – 
much less virtues localized to individual egos – as we have had in Western moral philoso-
phy, since Aristotle and the Th omists (or Alasdair MacIntyre more recently). Th e former 
is perhaps not unlike the Stoics’ virtue performatives.3 Th is in turn had an impact on the 
Smr. ti- derived śāstric moral (or dharma) rethinking.
Virtue informs the reciprocal relations between friends and companions: a person 
should display towards a friend generosity, courtesy and benevolence, treat him or her 
well, and keep promises. Th e friend thus ministered to reciprocates such conduct by pro-
tecting his or her companion when they are careless and off  their guard, looking aft er 
their property, off ering a refuge in danger, not letting them drown in their troubles, and 
showing consideration for their family. In similarly reciprocal fashion, the householder 
is expected to be friendly to ascetics and brahmanas in act, speech and thought, to keep 
his house open to them and to supply their temporal needs. Th e ascetics and brahmanas 
should counsel householders to refrain from doing evil, direct their mind towards the 
good, show compassion towards them, teach them what they have not heard, correct any 
wrong conceptions they have received, and reveal the path towards transcendence.
Th e Jainas have historical links with Greek gymnosophists – “naked philosophers” 
– and Stoics, and of course Buddhists, with whom they share the non- brahmanical yoga- 
ascetic heterodoxy. Th e cultivation of virtue, particularly through the practice of nonvio-
lence, demonstrates a close link between the metaphysical and the ethical in Jaina ethics. 
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Th e Jainas posit a living universe that must be protected. Th is respect for life developed 
into a series of comprehensive treatises on the nature of karma. Th e later philosophical 
tradition, as articulated in Umāsvāti’s Tattvārtha Sūtra (ca. 100 ce), states that the universe 
is brimming with souls weighted by karmic material (dravya), many of which hold the 
potential for freeing themselves from all karmic residue and attaining spiritual liberation 
(kevala). Th ese souls constantly change and take new shape due to the fettering presence 
of karma, which is described as sticky and colourful. By fi rst accepting this view of reality 
and then carefully abiding by the fi ve major vows (nonviolence, truthfulness, not stealing, 
sexual restraint and non- possessiveness), the Jaina aspirant moves towards the ultimate 
goal of untrammelled spirituality. At the pinnacle of this achievement, all karmas disperse 
and the perfected one (siddha) dwells eternally in omniscient (sarvajña) solitude (kevala). 
By carefully observing harmlessness to the greatest degree possible, one purges oneself of 
the negative karmas that cause repeated rebirth within the lower realms of the cosmos.
EMOTION AND VIRTUE
In the broader Indian theorizing on ethics there is a strong connection made between 
emotion and virtue. A brief discussion of the battlefi eld dialogue between Krishna and 
the distraught warrior Arjuna in the epic Th e Mahābhārata (1985), narrated in the book 
famously known as the Bhagavad Gītā, which we shall render as the “Great Song”, will 
help bring out some salient features of this connection and highlight three basic insights 
that arise from it.
Moments before a major assault is launched, the warrior Arjuna shows signs of fatigue 
and loss of strength, letting the powerful bow Gān. d. īa slip from his hands. His half- muted 
request to slow the chariot to a stop takes Krishna, his charioteer- friend, by surprise. 
Arjuna is palpably troubled by something and his judgement appears to be hazing over: 
there are more components to it than his regular cognitive percepts would indicate. It is a 
matter of (his) mood. His “inner sense” is thrown into a state of confusion, panic and deep 
pity (kr. pa), his limbs have become weak, mouth dry, body trembling, hair standing on 
end, and skin erupting in a burning sensation. He confesses that the once- cherished desire 
( kan. ks. e) for conquest and his aligned convictions appear shaky; he wonders aloud whether 
there is any joy at the end of this bloody journey – or even in living? (I.32). Expressing a 
deeper fear for the death of his kinsfolk at his own hands, he says to Krishna: “Th erefore 
there is no justifi cation in killing our own kinsfolk” (I.37).
Arjuna continues his disquisition, underscoring utilitarian appeals to the evils of 
warfare and a plea towards altruistic compassion: “the rescinding of family laws, ancestral 
rites, and timeless traditions, with the ultimate consequence of the collapse of society and 
descent into hellish chaos” (I. 40–44). He can no longer stand by his earlier resolve to fi ght, 
now that the “moral emotion” that he is struggling to articulate appears to be inconsistent 
with the “moral duty” he was brought up to believe in.
Fallen into self- pity, the despondent warrior pleads to Krishna to make sense of his 
woeful plight. Is Arjuna appealing to the pristine virtue of reason over emotions, or is he 
instead asking Krishna to tell him if his emotions are serving him well? Can emotions 
prefi gure morally appropriate, “objective” and reasonable responses, even if they appear 
to elude his cognitive or rational discernment? He has not yet discerned clearly whether 
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he feels shamed, guilty, regretful, remorseful, or a combination of these; or none of these 
but something else. Krishna, for his part, proceeds cautiously in helping Arjuna unearth 
his deep perturbation.
Krishna plays the dual role of a guru and an analyst rolled into one. Th e guru can, with 
measured smirk and laughter (hasya), rebuke his honoured friend for losing heart at a 
critical moment. As an analyst though, he implores Arjuna to search out reasons for the 
fragility of his judgement. Arjuna’s objections to engaging in war appear to be based on 
well- thought- out and fi rm ethical grounds, but when he sets out to articulate the “inspired 
thought” intelligently, his arguments emerge as being scarcely coherent, and the appeal 
to his own conscience is minimally illuminating. But he is concerned that he is not able 
to see justice in this situation. In other words, he gives vent to a moral sentiment that he 
has arrived at as though intuitively (as Hume might also put it); his arguments, it will be 
noticed, are tangled up in his intense emotional reaction, the source of which he is not able 
to discern clearly. We can wonder why Arjuna remains perturbed by his emotional condi-
tion despite Krishna’s irenic response. Why would Krishna want to seemingly dismiss his 
friend’s condition? Is it a socially improper or morally unworthy state to be in? Perhaps it 
is psychologically or psychosomatically painful and therefore bereft  of utility? Or is such 
an emotional state simply irrational because it fogs well- intended judgement and vitiates 
the Rawlsian equation of “rational frustration” and “appropriate moral response” that 
Matilal (2007) sanguinely argued for elsewhere? But what if emotions have other values 
and effi  ciencies (bhāvaka)? For example, a “moral emotion” may go against the grain of 
cherished religious mores that might, in themselves, be irrational. Have not his emotions 
made Arjuna a little more refl ective, muddled though he is now, than he might otherwise 
have been about his proper duties? Is he not, as a result, at least “talking it out” with his 
friend? Indeed, might there not be an obligation to have such emotions, just as there is a 
duty on Arjuna’s part to engage in an action? Might it not also be a person’s inalienable 
right, on a par with aesthetic or dramatized emotions, whose value no one really questions 
in the comforts of a theatre seat or the civic sponsored museum and art gallery?
Th is dialogue brings out some salient features of the relation between emotion and 
virtue and highlights three basic insights. Th e fi rst insight is that a deeply subjective 
dimension with a strong evaluative sensibility is implicit in emotion, from which certain 
judgements about good and bad, desirability or undesirability, approval and disapproval 
are projected onto the object, the act, the “other”, the event or the situation in the relevant 
fi eld of awareness. One might call this evaluative aspect a belief; that is, the subject believes 
some state of aff airs to obtain. Th is might arise as a second- order judgement when passion 
has delivered its own verdict to reason, as when one rhetorically introspects: “I am an idiot; 
why did I react in anger? But I did feel right about it at the time.” Th is evaluative stance is 
considered to be a signifi cant ingredient of emotion as it is an important (though not the 
only) way by which a culture grounds its citizens’ responsive sensibility towards personal 
and social values, ethical imperatives, shared experiences and moral recollections of the 
tradition (or transcendental valuing). It is for this reason that moral dilemmas and confl ict 
of values are able to evoke such strong emotions; and conversely, emotions articulate these 
moral perturbations – this is the theme of the next insight.
Th e second insight is that emotion refl ects the moral repertoire of the community or 
culture of which the person is a signifi cant member, in that confl icts may begin to surface 
when there is a clash between an emotional response or sentiment (bhava) in the subject 
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and certain moral principles enshrined in the culture (the “horizon” or “background moral 
knowledge” of the tradition). Th us, suppose that aft er the Buddha and the Jaina, and by the 
time of the great Epic tradition (or even as late as Gandhi facing the colonialist General 
Dwyer), the principle of ahimsa or non- injury becomes constitutive of the cultural self- 
understanding and the moral order of a people, but that the calling to war is considered 
to be a great virtue and the need of the day: duty as virtue. As a result, a citizen may feel 
immense tension welling inside her, because her emotional response suggests a negative 
moral evaluation of the consequences of war, the value of which she thought her com-
munity had valorized, and which she had indeed internalized. Th e absent loci of a strong 
corresponding bhāva (sentiment) for the virtue ahimsa and its surrogate sentiment of 
non- aggression is being usurped by the more threatening virtue of him. sā (violence) with 
its surrogate bhāva of aggressiveness; this inversion may now stand poised as the “intimate 
enemy”, the scourge of the “bounds of righteous duty”.
Th e third insight is that there is a show of altruistic compassion (daya, lokakr. pā) rein-
forced by what seems to be a dispassionate but patently consequentialist appeal to adverse 
outcomes if some other sentiment or “calling” is heeded rather than the one “appropriate” 
to the occasion. Th us the warrior- citizen Arjuna might be led to construe his existential 
state as being one of intense depression; and is thereby provoked into fearing the con-
sequences of the pending encounter. Th e dispassion may be expressed through a story 
about the disastrous state of aff airs the society will be plunged into in the aft ermath of the 
battle. In other words, utilitarian and consequentialist considerations are searched out and 
appealed to in order to reinforce the fl edgling moral judgement, but more importantly to 
determine the correct emotional response to the case in hand: how should one act under 
the circumstances? Compassion might be the fi rst step in the procedural directive being 
worked out by allowing greater scope to “intelligent sentiment” than mere reliance on 
the cool, detached, dis- passionate aloofness of reason. Th e “rational”, or what would be 
considered reasonable in real- life responsiveness, is not a prerogative of reason alone (as 
in most theories of rationality, or economic rationalism) (Posner 1981: 1).
ANTI- VIRTUES
Counterfactually, the theory that underscores the role of emotions in virtues fi nds it expe-
dient to elucidate certain “anti- virtues”, the overcoming of which might give one a better 
understanding of what the true virtues are.4 According to Th e Mahābhārata (1985: bk 4/5, 
289) there are twelve negative emotions that make for the polar opposite or divergences, 
namely, “anti- virtues” (a term I prefer to Aristotelian “vices”) in that these emotions stand 
in the way of self- control and so are to be avoided. Th ese are: anger, desire, greed, delusion, 
possessiveness, non- compassion, discontent, pride, grief, lust, jealousy and abhorrence. It 
is interesting to note that anger and desire head the list. Th e classical Indian Yoga system 
has a term stronger than emotion (as bhāva) for these modes; they are called kleśas. Th e 
Abhidharma Buddhist school has a similar theory about kleśas functioning as emotional 
predispositions or tendencies (anusaya), which lie “dormant” or latent at the unconscious 
level. Th e kleśas are regarded as forms of psychic sedimentation which give rise to mental 
disturbances or excitations, and, like cognitive responses, these are deeper or more robust 
responses than bodily “feelings” (pathē) or mere habitual dispositions (hexis).
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Desire as lack, then, is a prime suspect heading or enveloping all kleśas: it colours all 
our emotions from beneath as it were, and its frustration translates more readily into 
obstructive anger than into pleasure (though perhaps both). However, that morbid pleas-
ure (desire as plenum) might be seen as more obstructive than “righteously felt indigna-
tion” would in some contexts. Th us, while Arjuna could be said to have harboured a desire 
for the kingdom in dispute (at least until the moment of his emotional collapse), he appears 
not to have expressed any anger. Th is is rather puzzling, given that he seems to have been 
overwhelmed by just about every other major negative aff ect, and took some pleasure in 
the positive aff ect of generalized compassion (kr. pā). I want to dwell on this issue awhile.
It appears that the Mahābhārata’s Great Song is open to alternative perspectives to the 
stark ascetic or stoical tendencies of the ancients. As we saw earlier, Krishna, although 
apparently denigrating them, did not deny or show disrespect for Arjuna’s revaluations of 
his calling to war, his duty, and so on. In point of fact, Krishna listened intently and recog-
nized a touching concern. He only rebuked Arjuna, or rather questioned him regarding 
the grounds on which he was making his revaluations, just as Arjuna could expect to be 
questioned were he making them in a perfectly regular (or “normal”) rational state. Is he 
sure that he is not simply projecting his own self- pity as generalized sympathy or altruistic 
compassion onto others?
Nevertheless, Arjuna proved right in the long run in his prophylactic emotional 
response. Everything the beleaguered warrior suspected in his apparently confused, 
fearful, semi- morbid and besotted state – the destruction of the kingdom, the burning 
down of the Khān. d. ava forest with all the animals therein, the carnage of the elders, the 
collapse of family and tradition, the ruin of his bow, Gān. d. īva, the demise of his invincible 
golden chariot, and so on – did eventuate and was recognized to be so during the tragic 
course and untriumphant inconclusive ending of the war. Th e evil that Arjuna had por-
tended in his seemingly bizarre emotional turpitude, and the reasons he proff ered for his 
fears in that most despondent and emotionally charged condition (I.31/36–40), played 
themselves out in the real world. Although, to be sure, the moral judgement he ventured 
in his perturbed state was not what the society, consistent with the norms of the time, was 
prepared to countenance, as we can observe in hindsight (Matilal 1989). It is clear that any 
consequentialist appeal, whether by the agent or by the theoretician two millennia on, will 
not suffi  ce to justify a particular emotional response.
Th e second point here pertains to the relation between desire and karma or action. 
Karma is necessarily conditioned by an antecedent kāma (desire) and ineluctably followed 
by a corresponding phala (fruit), either in this or in a subsequent life- world (punarjanma) 
(de Smet 1977: 59). All actions are binding and also delimited by their outcome: good ones 
to (and by) a pleasant fruit; bad ones to (and by) a painful one.
EMOTION WITHOUT VIRTUE IS BLIND; 
IRTUE WITHOUT EMOTIONS REMAINS EMPTY
As should be apparent, the discourse of desire receives a great deal more attention than, 
say, anger in the Great Song. Krishna has not denied Arjuna’s inherent capacity to make 
fair judgement of the situation, he has simply cast doubt on Arjuna’s ability to reason and 
correctly evaluate his situation while being in the grips of desire. Th is is indeed a paradox: 
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Arjuna believed that he had come to the point of relinquishing all desires – the desire that 
attaches itself to glory, fame, booty from war, a share in the disputed kingdom, the fulfi l-
ment of caste- duty, and so on. His desire has been perturbed by his emotional response in 
the situation. Krishna, on the other hand, in his presumably higher wisdom or culturally 
privileged position, tells Arjuna that he is affl  icted with desire, and attachment to desire 
causes other kinds of perturbations; not least, frustration, anger, a sense of unsatisfactori-
ness (duh. kha), and an undignifi ed death at journey’s cruel end. Only if a person will rid 
himself of all desires and remain content within himself, will he be called (ceteris paribus 
in the larger hermeneutic reading) “a person of balanced reason” (sthitaprajñāna, II 55). 
Time and again Krishna’s sermon underscores the negative aspects of emotions such as 
anger (II 56), fear (V 28), passion (V 26) and egotism (II 54), unless moderated by the 
cool judgement and dispassion of buddhi, a resolute will steeped in wisdom (jñāna) and 
ethically fi ne- tuned action (nis. kāma- karma yoga).
In practical terms what is expected of Arjuna or any adept is not the willingness to 
forfeit or relinquish these emotions in their entirety – and desire is no exception here 
– but rather to exercise in incremental measure the virtues of (a) equanimity or a mean 
sense of balance, an equilibrium, and (b) dispassion or disinterested passion (nis. kāma) 
towards and between the extremes, so that work (karma) goes on. Krishna preaches even- 
mindedness (samata) towards pleasure and pain – in general, indiff erence towards pairs 
of opposites (I 57, II 38, II 45) – as well as not being too excited when experiencing joy, 
nor feeling ruffl  ed when facing sorrow (V 20). In this light Aristotle would be mistaken 
in holding that anger is essential to a good human life (see Stocker with Hegeman 1996: 
253). However, the kind of dispassion that Krishna is preaching here is appropriate only 
in relation to insuff erable personal aff ront rather than a slight to one’s group, clan or com-
munal identity – for which the reaction is more structured and where the respondent at 
large is the tradition. “Balanced reason” was the virtue most exalted above self- pity and 
self- concern, and even over the virtues of compassion, dispassion, altruism, and self- 
enlargement or self- realization, for the objective is to let truth (not self or one’s god or aura 
of a beloved) shine through emotions (bhāva, rasa and bhakti) as much as in cognitions 
and hermeneutical acts. Th e kingpin is reason. Th e seat of reason is buddhi (or bodhi in 
Buddhist rendition) – the intelligent will – and it is towards the stabilization and refi ne-
ment of the latter that the qualities and virtues being inculcated here are out- tended. While 
one can use yogic methods to withdraw from the objects of sense in order to prevent 
further sensations from arising – as the oft - used metaphor of the tortoise withdrawing its 
head suggests – it is not so easy to curb inner and unconscious perturbations born of kleśas 
(“psychic black mirror”) and other sedimented (inverted memory) traces. Tranquillity 
(śhāntarasa), achieved through prolonged practice of concentration of the mind, or medi-
tation, may be necessary for the “cessation of all sorrows” (II 65). Disposition towards 
nonviolence, veracity, absence of anger, compassion for all beings, and freedom from the 
thirst of either extreme are among the highest virtues inculcated through the pragmatics 
of yoga; but virtues can never take the place of experienced or felt aff ectivities themselves. 
Th e ideal is a mere surrogate for the real thing.
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VIRTUE IN BIOMEDICAL PRACTICES
Th e combined Śraman. ic or Jaina- Yoga- Buddhist ethics of virtues has had tremendous 
impact in another area or branch of ethics as well, namely, biomedical/bioethical practices. 
Many scholars have argued that the beginning point of Indian bio[medical] ethics ought to 
be the sam. hitās of Caraka and Śus.ruta, dating back to antiquity (ca. 1000 bce). However, 
these are mostly recordings of normative prescriptions and desirable practices by the pre-
vailing norms of the society in the particular era these authors lived through. Principles can 
only be drawn by extensional parity from such nuanced pronouncements, rules, norms and 
practices; admittedly, it takes a lot more to work up a principle, as distinct from rules and 
normative observations. Perhaps in hindsight that is the calling of the philosopher of the 
tradition. Nevertheless here, in these textual forays, we fi nd explicit prescriptions concern-
ing the duty of virtuous physicians, which is to attend to, heal, and return to good health 
the ailing and the affl  icted, regardless of their race, caste, social status and standing. Th ere 
are explicit prohibitions against fatal harm (ahim. sā) to oneself as upon others inscribed 
in Āpastambasūtra I 9.25, I 3, 6; Īśavasya Upanis. ad 3; Kaut.lya’s Arthaśātra IV 7; Parasara 
IV 1–2: Yama 20–21; Manusmr. ti II 90–91, V 89; Yajñavalkyasmr. ti III 253; Gotamasmr. ti 
23.1; Vaśis. ta- dharmasmr. ti 13.14, 20.20, 23.14–18. In all these treatises, the bottom line 
appears to be reverence for all forms of life, from micro- organisms and plants to animals 
and human beings (Coward et al. 1989: 71–103). But it proscribes treating those who are 
extremely abnormal, wicked, or of miserable character and conduct, as well as “those who 
are at the point of death” (Menon & Haberman 1970). Hindu medical ethics would appear 
to stress the importance of the proscription against killing. Buddhist medical ethics, con-
sistent with its general moral sensibilities, emphasized the virtues of non- injury, compas-
sion, and an ethic of care towards all creatures, great and small. Jaina ethics echoes both the 
Hindu and Buddhist medical ethics, with an unusually positive disposition towards “vol-
untary fasting to death” under certain circumstances. Some forms of spiritualized “good 
death” could be a virtue in itself, clocking up more merits; and such extraordinary good 
deeds even in Aristotle’s account assures one a transition into the aft er- world.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Th e overall teaching on virtues in the Indian ethical tradition comes down to this (as 
a conditional counterfactual): If one could cultivate the alternative emotion of detach-
ment (asakti) as a virtue in its own right (Bhagavadgītā III 25), freeing oneself from the 
temptations of kāma (desire) and also anger, then one would achieve a state of reasonable 
intelligence (vyavasāyātmikā buddhir ekeha, ibid. II 41) and in this resolute state deter-
mine the best course of practical action. Such actions would be nis.kāama; that is, empty 
of desire and sthitaprajña, and “of steadfast constitution”. Th is is a normative heuristic, 
not a categorical imperative, for virtues can no more be prescribed than emotions. Th ey 
can only be cultivated, prophylactically and pedagogically, in a cultural setting. Actions 
carried out in this state do not bind one; that is to say, karma no longer accrues, for one no 
longer expects rewards from one’s action (II 39/VI 14). Desire and self- interest bracketed, 
one is left  in a state of freedom to perform actions from a sense of duty (rather than feel 
compelled by duty or the “force of law” as commandment).
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Curiously, this locution about duty without regard to the fruits begins to sound like the 
Kantian maxim of duty over passion. We have argued, however, that this is not an appeal 
to a deontological imperative with a strong “ought” component. Rather, it involves a sig-
nifi cant apprehension of a situation, with a strong “is” component. It is one thing to say 
categorically, “Do X, according to your duty, without regard to desire”; but quite another 
to say, appealing to prudence, “Do X, according to your duty, when you are at peace with 
desire in that intention.” Th e former can lead to suppression of desire and pathological 
inclinations, for it ignores the impact on the subject’s well- being as well as the subject’s 
connection to a cultural system of values. Th e latter, on the other hand, clearly draws 
attention to, and challenges one to come to terms with, desire, recognizing that unless 
one is at peace, the mental life, which in turn aff ects the moral constitution, may not be 
fi rm (dhrti) so as to guarantee a balanced harmonious judgement, nor also, therefore, the 
goodness of the fruits or results of the ensuing action.
Th e moral import of emotions is not, then, undermined in the interest of emphasizing 
the obligations in respect of duty. Indeed, duty is understood, appreciated and re- appraised 
through insightful emotional response, as Aristotle in book II of Ethics also stipulates (II 
5). Th is response is modulated, on the one hand, by self- love and, on the other, by regard 
to the wider horizon of cultural sensitivities. Towards the very end of their enchanting 
though exhaustive colloquy, Krishna does not issue an unmitigated command to Arjuna; 
rather, he leaves it to his own better judgement, with these telling words: “Having refl ected 
on this [my words] in all its ramifi cations, do as you desire” (XVIII 63, emphasis added). In 
short, Krishna did not implore Arjuna to eliminate all desires, perform his duty regardless 
of desire, or to simply do his bidding “because I am your god”.
Echoing Nussbaum’s insight that late modernity is turning its ethical gaze towards 
the ways of the ancients (1992: 9), the major diff erentiations between Indian ethics and 
modern Anglo- American eff orts to ground moral philosophy are found in tradition and 
concrete particularity gaining emphasis over abstract, ahistorical universality, and its 
respect for deeply rooted practices, customs, mores, laws, values and lived wisdom, which 
are seen as more important than purely theoretical concerns. One has to learn to imagine 
what it is to think ethics with the tradition, rather than for it. Refl ection and rational justi-
fi cation embraces alternative possibilities and critiques (Śramān. ic- yoga or Jaina- Buddhist 
versus Brahmān. ic categories), and prioritizes the wider community or social whole over 
the unmitigated interests of the individual as the basis for ethical virtues of moral care 
until, perhaps, later in the lifecycle (for example, the added value of moks. a or spiritual 
liberation). Th e eminent centrality, especially, of virtues, emotions and aesthetics – and 
their inexorable interrelation, as shown in the argument of the Great Song – is also fi xed 
within the Indian ethical framework and so is never far from its thinking on normative 
principles and their applicability.
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NOTES
 1. A fi nal consequence of this conception of dharma is found in Buddhist logic, where all phenomena in 
their fi xity and quiddity are called dharmas.
 2. See Aristotle’s distinction between aretai and techai in his Ethics, book 2 (II, 4. 110a17–b5).
 3. See Sharpe, this volume, Chapter 3.
 4. Th e bulk of the discussion in this section occurs in a chapter treating more fully of emotions (but not 
virtues as such) in Bilimoria (2004).
